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Armenia,  like all of the economies  of the former  Soviet  Union,
faces  a host  of problems  in reforming  the labor  market:  choosing
the right pace for reallocating  labor, setting  up a well-function-
ing wage  determination  system,  fostering  geographic  mobility,
providing  adequate  income support  to the jobless and the poor,
and designing  appropriate  active policies  for the labor market.
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This paper-  a product of the Transition and Macro-Adjustment Division, Policy Research Department
- is part of a larg.er  effort in the department to investigate how labor markets work during the transition
of socialist economies. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC20433. Please contact Susana Flor-z, room NI 1-017, extension 39075 (September 1993,
34 pages).
Reform of ~he  iabor market in the former Soviet  in some areas too radical and in others smacking
Union (FSU) is essential to increase productiv-  of the old interventionism.
ity. The transition of the FSU economies to a
market economy must i.ivolve a massive dis-  Vodopivec and Vroman offer several general
placement of workers, and will entail labor  policy guidelines:
shortages for certain skills. A key challenge will
be to reallocate labor at the lowest social costs.  *  Undertake several initiatives, not just one-
possibly worker training as well as job search
Vodopivec and Vroman identify key labor  assistance, sclf-erployment  grants, and tempo-
market issues in Armenia, reflecting on the  rary publi,; employment.
dilemmas and options policymakers face both in
Armenia and elsewhere in the FSU.  *  Use some resources to monitor and evaluate
interventions, so you find out "what works."
Armenians are ardent advocates of radical
reform and have already made progress in  *  Coordinate active policy interventions and
several areas (including successful privatization  the interface between active and passive instru-
of land in 1990). But the Armenian transition is  ments.
taking place in particularly unfavorable circum-
stances - including a severe energy crisis  *  Be prepared to change as the macroeco-
because of an economic blockade imposed by  nomic environment changes, and take advantage
neighboring Azerbaijan.  of the current climate. Under high inflation, for
example, consider widening the wedge between
In Armenia, current labor policies represent  wages and various cash and in-kind transfers.
a step in the right direction because they leave  When inflation abates, consider paying cash
primary responsibility for finding a job to the  benefits on the basis of prior earnings.
individual. The state's role is simply to provide a
social safety net and to create an environmnent  *  Above all, be flexible and sensitive to
that generates jobs. Tangible progress has been  signals and changes in signals. Among policy
made but the adjustment process has just begun  options, one size does not fit all.
and is hindered by inconsistent labor policies-
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Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTHE ARMENIAN  LABOR MARKET  IN TRANSMTION:
ISSUES  AND OPTIONS
Milan Vodopivec
The World Bank




The Urban InstituteTABLE  OF CONTENTS
1.  An overview  of the Armenian Labor Market  .......  ......................  2
2.  2urrent Labor Market Policies and Practices ............................  14
3.  Issues and Options ........................................  17
4.  Concluding  Remarks ........................................  30
References ...................................  33
Tables
Table I  ..............  3
Table 2  ..............  5
Table 3  ..............  6
Table 4  ..............  7
Table 5  ..............  8
Table 6  .....  .............. 9
Table 7 .10
Table 8  ........  11
Table 9 ...  12
iFormer socialist economies  of Eastern Europe and Soviet Union are starting to fundamentally
restructure their economic  and political systems - with the clear goals of a market economy and
multiparty  systems. Labor market reform is essential  these efforts.  First, due to numerous, severe
rigidities  o, the labor market under the comrmunist  regime, the labor market has functioned extremely
inefficiently. Hence  labor market reform is a prerequisite for achieving  productivity increases.
Second, labor market policies should also contribute  to sustainabiity of overall reforms, by alleviating
the costs connected  with labor reallocation  that ultimately  wili be required in these economies.
Based on the account of the transition of the Armenian  labor market to date, the purpose of
the paper is to identify  the main issues of the ransition related to the labor mark-et,  as well as reflect
on the dilemmas  of and options for policy makers both in Armeniz and elsewhere in the Former
Soviet Union (FSU).  As in many FSU economies, current Armenian labor market policies represent
the first, but decisive, step in the right direction: they leave primary responsibility  for finding a job to
the individual,  and let state provide a social safety net and a conducive  environment  for generation  of
jobs.  Some tangible  progress  has been achieved, such as the introduction  of unemployment  benefits
and flexible  layoffs, freeing  of wages, and easing the pressure on enterprises to hire.  But the
adjustment  of the Armenian labor market is still in a very early stage. Although enterprises  have
significantly  shrunk  their employment  in 1992, it seems that they have done so primarily through the
shedding of pensioners, a much less painful adjustment  process than factory closings and other mass
displacements  which have barely started.  The adjustment  process is hindered by incons.stent  labor
market policies. These policies  are in some areas too radical, and in some others still smack of old
interventionism,  in either event leaving ample room for improvement.
Although  the paper aims at discussing  generic issues  of labor market transition to a market
economy, the choice of Armenia  necessarily introduces  some of the country's specificities. Chief
among them are the following  two.  In contrast  to many other former republics of Soviet Union,
Armenian are very ardent advocates  of radical reforms, and have already made good progress in
several areas (including  successful  privatization  of land in 1990). But (on the negative side) theAnmenian  trtnsition is taking placa in extremely unfavorable external  circumstances  - there is a
severe energy crisis due to economic  blockade imposed by neighboring  Azerbaijan.,
We review the main features of the Armenian labor market in section 1, describe recent
institutional  reforms in section 2, identify mijor issues and reflect on options available to
policymakers  in section 3, and provide concluding remarks in section  4.
1.  An Overview  of the Armenian  Labor Market
The following  major features  of the Armenian  labor market - many  of them produced by the
rigidities  of the Soviet regime, and hence shared by all FSU economies  - can be identified:
predominance  of state sector employment;  recent expansion  of non-state  employment;  hidden
unemployment;  nascent open unemployment;  concentration  of employment  in industry; non-existent
part-time  work; pay egalitarianism  and distorted interindustry  wage structure; divergent rends in
productivity  and real earnings; relatively  high labor turnover and low geographical  mobility; high
female  labor force participation;  good formal education  of the labor force, and modest population
growth.  Moreover, due to the political conflict with neighboring  Azerbaijan,  there has been a large
net inflow of immigrants  since 1988.
PredoMinance-of  state sector employment. A feature of socialist economies  that has
profoundly influenced  their operation  is the predominance  of state sector employment  - the sector
that has always been preferred by the authorities  in socialist countries. This goal was originally
achieved  by nati^nalizing  most of the means of nroduction, leaving limited  scope for the private
sector.  Private sector was kept insignificant  by legal limitations, discriminatory  taxation, and limited
access to and unfavorable  terms for credit.
In 1991, Armenian  state sector provided jobs to 1,217 thousand  workers - more than three
qumrters  of all employed  workers (table 1 in appendix). But since its peak in 1987, state employmerw
has been steadily declining,  particularly  strongly in 1991, when it shnmk for nine percentage points
(from 84.9 percent to 75.9 percent of the national  total).
Due to the blockade,  only about 30 percent of industrial enterprises  were operating in the
beginning  of 1992.
2Recent  eaion  of nonm-state  nloment.  The decline  of stae sector  employment  wu
largely  due to the offlcial  sanctioning  of non-etat ewiployment  in cooperatives  and private  farms.
Ceoiperatives  emkxged  in 1987  and  their employment  expanded  very dyaamically  during  1988-1990
(table  1). Tnough  their employment  declined  in 1991,  that  year  they  still  employed  120,030)  workers
Table 1:  LAMR FORCE,  19W-1991
(in  thOuands)
1960  1960  1984  1997  1968  1969  1990  1991
state  Sector  Emplot'ue  m218  1386  1403  1417  1406  1350  1330  1217
Percent of  wmmn  44.8  U.9  47.0  47.6  47.7  48.0  48.6  4U.5
Cooerativwr  .*--  -. 7  41.6  82.5  127.4  120
Peccent  of  woman  *-  29.f  41.8  44.1  38.4  37.5
Koikhozi  79.8  74.1  3.1  69.9  57.4  54.1  53.6  12
percent  of  women  46.0  43.S  43.6  42.5  46.5  45.8  44.6  4t.7
Private  Agricult.  78.9  83.4  92.1  93.3  102.5  101.8  114  264
Porcent of  woen  88.1  86.9  87.3  86.5  83.3  80.0  76.8  61.0
Private  Non-Agriculture  0.8  0.9  1.Z  1.3  5.1  3.6  5.6  6
Percent  of  women  37.5  33.3  33.3  30.8  41.2  27.8  23.2  40.0
Total  Eoploy  nt  1377.5  1546.4  1569.4  1583.2  1612.6  1592  1630.6  1619
Percent of  wo  mn  47.4  48.9  49.2  49.7  49.7  49.7  49.5  49.6
UnnPloyed  .*  40  50  30  60  60  63
Perccnt  of  women  ...  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  1Y.0
Total  Labor Force  1377.5  1546.4  1609.4  1633.2  1642.6  1652  1690.6  1684
percent  of  women  47.4  48.9  48.3  48.6  49.1  48.5  48.3  48.3
Memorafdus  itams
Share of  Sttes  ENployYmnt
(inctuding  kolkhozi)  94.2  94.5  94.1  93.9  90.7  88.2  64.9  73.9
unemployment  rate  ...  ,,,  2.5  3.1  1.8  3.6  3.5  3.9
working  st  poput.  1807  1957.3  1979.4  1996.8  2001.2  2008.1  2021.1  2039
participation  rate  76.2  79.0  81.3  51.7  82.1  82.3  83.6  62.6
Pert.  rate  woman  70.5  73.8  77.0  77.9  79.0  78.2  79.2  75.2
Part.  rate  . Rwn  81.9  82.4  85.8  85.7  85.3  86.5  88.2  87.2
Sources:  Statistical  Office  of  Armenia; Ministry  of  Labor  of  Arwnnie  (unaiploywent  estimates).
Motes:  Octa  for  1991  are preliainarV.  Uneaployment  rate  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of  un  nployed  in  the
Inbor  force.  Participation  rate  is  defined  as the  percent  of  the  labor  force  in  the  working  age populatlon
(age 1659).  Under  ptiYote  agriculture,  person  officiallY  labelled  "employed  in  auxilliery  activitios"  are
aiso  included.  In  1991,  there  was an  increase  of  private  farmnre  due  to  the  privatization  of lard.
3(7.1 percent of the labor force). 2 Private farming was strongly boosted by the 1990/91  privatization
of land; new private farmers were recruited not only from former state and cooperative  farmers, but
also from workers who had previously worked in the state sector outside agriculture.
Hidden unemploMent.  Together with  a other socialist economies, Armenia  has suffered
considerable  hidden unemployment  (overstaffing). Estimates  of the rate of hidden unemployment
(expressed  by government  officials and enterprise  managers) ranged from 20 to 30 percent.
(According  to some reports, underuse of work time - a proxy for hidden unemployment  - in Eastern
European  countries  has ranged from 10 to 30 percent).'
The following  factors contributixi  to hidden  unemployment. First, under soft budget
constraints,  firms hoarded labor so as to improve their ability to (over)fulfill  the production  targets set
by the center. Second, once employed, workers  had no fear from losing their jobs - they could be
dismissed  only for seriously breaching work discipline  (with unexcused  absences, for example, or
drunkenness  on the job).  Such a virtually complete  job security redLced  the ability of the fuTm  to
adjust its worlforce effectively. Third, firms were forced to hire wotkers through both administrative
job assignments,  as well as informal pressures  by Party officials.
Nascent  open unemplovment. As in other socialist economies, open unemployment  was not
officially  recognizeL  under the Soviet regime - which is not to say that it did not exist.  Absent
official  statistics, one could only rely on estimates  of unemployment. Estimates  of Armenian
unemployment  since 1986, however, are based on surveys conducted  by village soviets (in rural
areas) and district police (in urban azeas), and thus seem to be more than just 'educated guesses."
According  to these estimates, the unemployment  rate has increased from 2.5 percent in 1986,
reaching a rather modest 4 percent in 1991  (table 1).4
2  Total employment  in cooperatives  was 143,000, implying that 23,000 workers worked both in
state enterprises  and in cooperatives  ("sovmestytely").
3  Enterprises  could afford hidden unemployment  because  they faced soft budget constraints  (see.
for example, Vodopivec  (199la).
Oxenstierna  (1991) reports unemployment  rate of 3-6 percent for the whole USSR in 1989.
4Concentration  of emnloyment  in industry.  Armenia's employment  composition is sinilar to
that of other socialist economies. Employment  concentrated  in industry: in 1990, industry absorbed
43 percent of workers; 18 percent cf workers w .e farmers; and only 39 percent of workers was
employed  in services (table 2).  Moreover, contrary to the long-term trends in developed market
economies,  the share of employment  in industry increasevi  during the latter half of the 1980s (table 3).
High-income  OECD counties have much larger ie"vice  sectors.  Armenia's underdeveloped  service
sector thus provides  ample opportunities  for future expansion  (in areas such as financial services,
catering  and tourism, insurance, consulting, etc).
Table  2s COMPARISON  OF EXPLOYMINT  COMPOSITION,  1989
(percentage)
Agriculture  Indu._try  Services
Armenia  (1990)  18.2  43.0  36.8
Socialist  countries
East  Germany  10 3  45.4  44.4
Czechos1ovakia  11.7  47  1  41.1
Sulgaria  (1988)  19.3  46.3  34.4
Soviet  Union  (1988)  20.2  35.2  44.6
Hungary  (1985)  21.1  38.6  40.3
Yugoslavia  25.0  36.0  39.0
Poland  29.9  39.7  30.4
Selected  OECD  countries
Austria  8.0  37.0  55.1
France  6.4  30.1  63.5
Germany  3.7  39.8  56.5
Italy  9 3  ^2.4  58.2
Spain  13.0  32.9  54.0
Portugal  19.0  35.3  45.7
Sweden  3.6  29.5  67.0
United  Kingdom  2.1  29.4  68.4
United  States  2.9  26.7  70.5
Sources:  Statistical  Of_ice  of  Armenia;  Statistical  Yearbook  of
Yugoslavia,  various  issuesi  OECD,  Quarterly  Labour  Force  Statii:icu,
NO.4,  1990;  IIF,  IBRD,  OECD,  EBRD,  The  Economy  of USSR,  19901  L,
Riveros,  Wage  and Employment  Policies  in CzechoslovakLa,  PRHEE,  World
Bank,  1991,  processed;  C. Burda,  Labor  and  Product  Markets  in
Czechoslovakia  and  the  ex-GDR:  A Twin  Study,  INSEAD,  1991,
processed;  L. For,  Labor  Markets  in Bulgaria:  Policies,  Institutions,
and  Results,  EMIHR,  World  Bank,  1991,  processed;  World  Bank,  Poland:
Employment  Promotion  and  Services  for  a Market  Economy,  1990.
Notes:  Agriculture  comprises  :SIC  Major  division  1: agriculture,
hunting,  forestry,  and  fishing;  Industry  comprises  ISIC  Major
divisions  2-5:  mining  and  quarryingt  manufacturing;  electricity,
gas  and water;  and  construction.  Services  comprise  ISIC  Major
divisions  6-9  plus  0: wholesale  and  retail  trade,  restuarants  and
hotels;  transport,  storage  and  communications;  financing,
insurance,  real  estate  and  business  services;  community,  social  and
personal-services;  and  activ-i-tie-  not  adequate-ly-defined,
5Table  3:  STRUCTURE OF  EXPLOYMXNT  BY SECTOR
(percent  age)
1980  1985  1990
MNnufacturing and mining  30.2  29.9  31.8
Agriculture  22.0  20.3  18.2
construction  8.6  8.6  11.2
Transportation and communizations  6.9  6.9  5.6
Trade, catering and tourism  6.5  6.6  6.5
Craftv, howuning,  public utility  3.7  3.9  4.4
Financial services  0.7  0.8  0.9
Education and culture  15.1  15.1  16.4
Public health and social wwlfare  4.4  5.3  6.1
Administration  1.9  1.8  1.8
Source: Statistical Office of Armenia.
Nongxistetm.art-tiMwoEk.  Due to rigid employment  policies, virtually all employment  is
undertaken  on the fuil-time  basis.  Even though legislation  under the Soviet  regime allowed part-time
work,  employers  were encouraged  to employ on a full-time basis.  According  to the estimate of the
Ministry of Labor of Armenia, less than 0.5 percent of workers - mainly  retirees anu those taking
se=ond  jobs - work part-time.
Pay ezalitarianism  and distorted interindustry  wage stnr.  Drawing  from the writings of
Marx, socialist economies  have allegedly  pursued the principle 'to  everyone  according  to his work'
by using the so-called tariff system. Under the tariff system, jobs were classified  (based on such
factors as required education,  physical  strain, and working conditions)  into different skill grades - the
"skill-exertion  matrices - to which economywide  wage rates were centrally assigned  (they were
modified  by 'regional coefficients"  to account  for differences in climate). To stimulate productivity,
various bonus schemes  were superimposed  on base wages tying rewards either to individual
productivity  (piece rate) or to collective  productivity  (profit-sharing  schemes).  '
5  Wages are permitted  to exceed centrally assigned  wages in profitable  industries and/or firms.
On determination  of wages  in socialist economies,  see, for example,  Vodopivec  (1991b).
6Such wage deternination produced two major negative effects. First, the pay structure was
egalitarian,  thus dampening work incentives..  For example, the  A986  tariff rates called only for a 4.27
range between  the highest and the lowest basic tariff ra,e.  Second, sectoral structure of wages has
been biased in favor of blue collar workers -- for exam, *e, workers in manufacturing  are bette. paid
than workers in education  and culture (table 4).!  (Sectoial wage structure has been fairly stable since
1980  - with the exception  of public administration  and particularly (the small) financial  services
sector, which improved  their relative wages since 1986.)
Table 4: INTERINDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE 1/
(Percenti.ge  of  the  national  average-
1980  1986  199'
Armenia  (roubles)  16;  185  318
Manufacti:ring  and  mining  112  115  111
Agriculture  78  83  86
Construction  145  155  154
Transport  117  114  96
camunications  85  83  95
Trade, catering and tourism  80  72  67
Housing and public utilities  69  68  72
Financial services  94  95  199
Education and culture  84  79  76
Public health and social welfare  83  65  74
Administration  92  88  106
Source: Statistical Office of Armenia.
Notes:
1/  State sector only.
2/  Average  of the first nine months.
Divergent  trends of real earnings  and  nrod"ctj-ty.  The latter half of the 1980s  witnessed  a
widening  gap between  productivity  and real wages  - even though productivity  was falling, real wages
were growing, thereby changing  the structure of final demand in favor of consumption  (table 5).
6  Many of the industries  with below-average  wages have above-average  proportions of female
workers, e.g.,  education  and culture and public health and social welfare.
7Table 5: PRODUCTIVITY AIM EARNINGS,  1980-1991 1/
Productivity  Averago  nom.  Average real
(1980.100)  earnings  earnigns
(in roubles)  (1980-100) 2/
.980  100  161  100
1981  106  166  101
1982  107  170  100
1983  109  172  101
1984  113  176  104
1985  118  180  107
1986  118  185  108
1987  117  191  111
1988  113  199  115
1989  124 3/  254  146
1990  109  291  156
1991  s  380  105
Source:  Statistical Office of Armenia.
Notes:
1/  Productivity relates to the so-called material sphere (social
services are excluded).  Earnings refer to the state and cooperative
employment.
2/ Deflatjd h, index of X  6ail prices.
3/ Includes activities  following the December  1988 earthquake.
While increasing  up to  1985, productivity  (measured  as output per worker) has been fall,ng since then
(except in 1989, when there was an increase in economic  activities following  the December 1988
earthquake). In contrast, real earnings  per worker steadily grew in the 1980s  and in 1990, rising 56
percent above its 1980  level by 1990. (In 1991, productivity  and real earnings  decreased sharply, the
former falling two percent below its 1980 level, and the latter to five percent above its 1980 level.)
Relatively  high labor turnover and low geogranhical  mobility. Due to a overheated  labor
demand in the circumstances  of the soft budget constraint,  labor turnover (job changing)  rate in
Armenia  has been quite high, that is, comparable  to that in most OECD countries  (see table 6).
Traditionally  turnover in Armenia as in the rest of the former Soviet Union  has been much higher in
the blue collar occupations  (workers  as opposed  to employees). In contrast, geographic  mobility  has
8been  notoriously  low in socialist  economies. The prcp-ska  system  (see below) and the lack of a
functioning  housing  market  have been major  impediments.
Table 6: LABOR TURNOVER,  1975-1989
(Annual number of separations per 100 employees)
1975  1980  1985  1989
Armenia 1/  ---  17.9  13.1  19.3
Socialist countries
Yugoslavia  14.6  14.3  12.6  11.3
Poland  21.7  18.3  17.9  19.8
Hungary  ---  ---  ---  24.4
Czechoslovakia  ---  ---  17.9  19.6
Bulgaria  ---  ---  21.0
Soviet  Union  1/  ---  ---  ---  21.2
OECD countries
France  ---  17  18 2/
Germany  25  30  ---
Italy 1/  14  15  ---
Japan  16  14  14 2/
Sweden 1/  21  20  17 2/
U.K. 1/  30  25  21 2/
U.S. 1/  50  48  ---
Sources: Statistical office of Armenia; Statistical Yearbook of
Yugoslavia; Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia; Statistical
Yearbook of Poland; Statistical Yearbook of Hungary; World Bank,
Bulgaria: Crises and Transition to a Market Economy (Report No.
9046-BU, 1991 L), 1991; IMF, World Bank, OECD, EBRD, A Study of the





Hieh female  labor force participation. While the male labor force participation  rate in
Armenia  has been  comparable  to that in most OECD countries, the female participation  rate has been
much higher.  In 1989, the female  participation  :ate was 78.2 percent, similar to that in Scandinavia
and Eastern European  councries  (except Yugoslavia),  and higher than in the Soviet Union (table 7).
9Table  7: COMPARISON  OF LASOR  FORCE  PARTICIPATION  RATES,  1989
(percentage)
Total  Women  Men
Armenia  82.3  78.2  86.5
Socialist  economies
Czechoslovakia  87.3  84.6  89.8
Poland  80.2  77.2  82.9
Romania  84.2  80.6  87.3
Soviet  Union  78.0  72.0  84.0
Yugoslavia  64.5  55.6  73.3
Selected OECD  countries
Austria  67.2  54.3  80.4
France  65.6  55.7  75.4
Germany  68.2  54.5  82.8
Greece  59.8  43.4  75.6
Italy  60.7  44.0  77.8
Japan  73.4  59.3  87.2
Spain  58.6  39.9  77.4
Sweden  83.3  81.0  85.6
United  Kingdom  76.0  65.2  86.8
United  States  76.8  67.9  85.9
Sources:  Table  1; OECD  Employment  Outlook,  OECD,  Paris,  July  1990;
IMF,  IBRD,  OECD,  and  EBRD,  The  Economy  of USSR,  1990;  Statistical
Yearbook  of Czechoslovakia,  1990;  Statistical  Yearbook  of  Poland,
1990;  World  Bank,  Romania:  Accelerating  the  Transition:  Human  Resource
Strategies  for  the  1990s  (Report  No.  9577-RO),  May  1991:  World  Bank,
Yugoslavia:  The  Labor  Merket  and  the  System  of Cash  Benefits  (Report
No.  9607-YU),  July  1991.
Notes:  Participation  rate  is defined  as the  percentage  of the  labor
force  in the  population  of working  age.  The  latter  refers  to age
15-64,  except  for Armenia  (16-59);  for  Yugoslavia  (15-59  for  women,
15-64  for men);  Czechoslovakia  (15-55  for women,  15-60  men';  Poland
(18-59  women,  18-64  men),  and  Romania  (16-55  for women,  16-59  for
men).  Because  of the  differences  in the  definition  of working  age
population,  participation  rates  for  socialist  countries  tend  to be
biased  upward.  For  France,  Germany,  and  Greece,  women's  and  men's
participation  rates  refer  to  1988.
Well-educated  labor force.  Like the labor forces of the Eastern European economies, the
Armenian  labor force exhibits  a high level of formal education  (table 8).  The educational  attainment
average of 11.3 years is only slightly less than the highest  ranked socialist  economy, Czechoslovakia
(11.5 years), and is even above the average for the developed  market economies (10 years). Of
course, it is a more difficult  matter to assess how functional  the present skills of Armenian  labor force
are, particularlv  for meeting  the needs of the forthcoming  transition to a market economy.
10Table  8: EDUCATIONAL  CmUOIITION OF  THE LAM  FORCE
Percentage  of  the labor  force  with  Mean yeore
of  schooling
No  Primary  education  Seconmdry  education  Higher
education (completed  or  (completed  or  education
uincmpleted)  unempc eted)
Armenia  (1989)  1.0  56.2  23.6  19.2  11.3
Socialist  countries-average  2.2  39.4  52.4  5.9  9.5
Yugoslavia  (1981)  7.4  52.5  35.9  4.2  5.6
lulgaria  (1975)  4.0  67.6  22.5  5.9  8.7
Czechoslovakia  (1980)  0.0  37.5  55.7  6.8  11.5
Hungary  (1980)  0.7  28.2  62.7  8.4  10.4
Polamd  (1978)  1.3  8.6  8.7  5.4  10.7
Romania  (1977)  0.0  42.1  53.0  4.9  9  0
Developed  market  countries  0.4  27.1  56.1  16.3  )0.0
Southern  European  countries  12.5  59.1  20.6  7.8  5.9
Middle  East  and North  Africa  50.2  29.8  15.9  3.6  3.4
East  Asia  and the  Pacific  16.1  45.0  33.C  5.8  6.4
Sources:  Statistical  Office  of  Armenia;  G. Psecharopoulos  and  A.M. Arriagads,  The Educational  Composition  of
Labor  Force:  An  international  Comparison,  International  Labour  Review,  Vol.  125,  No.5, 1986.
Notes:  The  data  refer  to  formal  education.  Armenia's  unusually  high  percentage  of  workers  with  higher  education
is  at least  partly  attibutable  to  differeces  in  tho  system  of  education  - in  Armenia,  only  15 years  of
schooling  is  required  for  a hihger  school  degree.  In  the  group  of  developed  market  eecofiies  are:  Austria,
Belgiun,  Canida,  Denmrk,  Finland,  France,  West  Germany,  Japan,  Notherlands,  New Zealand,  Norway,  Switerleand,
and  United  States  (their  data  are  from  1975-82).  In  the  gro4  of  Southern  European  countries  are  Greece,
Portugal,  Spain,  and  Turkey  (their  data  are  from  1980-1).  In  the  group  of  Middlo  and North  Africa  countries  are
Afghanistan,  Algeria,  Bahrain,  Egypt,  Iran,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Morocco,  Qatar,  Syria,  Tunisia,  united  Arab
Emirates,  and  Yemen  (their  data  are from  1970-81).  In  the  Sest  Asia  and the  Pacific  countries  are  China,  Taiwan,
Fiji,  Hong kong,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysis,  Neo Caledonia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand,  and  Tongs  (their
data  are  from 1974-83).
Moderation  of The  population  growth. Due to a decreasing trend in fertility and increasing
trend in mortality (the latter particularly since 1989  - not counting  the earthquake  year 1988),
population  growth has been slowing down since 1984 (table 9). While population  growth exceeds  that
of the northern  republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU), it is considerably  lower than in the
muslim  republics of the FSU.
11Table  9:  DEMOGRAPHIC  INDICATORS
Population  Natural  growth  Fertility  Mortality
(thousands)  rate  (per  1000)  (per  1000)
(per  1000)
1950  1347  23.6  32.1  8.5
1961  1905  30.8  37.2  6.4
1971  2548  17.7  22.6  4.9
1980  3074  17.2  22.7  5.5
1981  3119  18.1  23.4  5.3
1982  3169  17.7  23.2  5.5
1983  3218  17.9  23.6  5.7
1984  3267  18.4  24.2  5.8
1985  3317  18.2  24.1  5.9
1986  3362  18.3  24.0  5.7
1987  3412  17.2  22.9  5.7
1988  3457  11.3  21.6  10.3  1/
1989  3449  15.6  21.6  6.0
1990  w515  16.3  22.5  6.2
1991  2/  3575  15.2  21.6  6.4
source:  Statistical  Office  of Armenia.
Notes:
1/  An  increase  in mortality  is due  to the  December  1988  earthquake.
2/  Preliminary  data.
Net inflow of immizrants. Starting  with February 1988, as a result of a political conflict
with the neighboring  Azerbaijan,  there has been a continual inflow of Armenians  from Azerbaijan,
and an outflow of Azerbaijanis  from Armenia. In total, it is estimated  that about 250,000 Armenians
immigrated  from Azerbaijan, and that about 170,000  of Azerbaijanis  emigrated from Armenia. In
1991, the corresponding  numbers are 32,000 and 600, indkating that the migration  flows have slowed
down.
Recent  Trends: the Beeinning  of Labor Reallocation
While some of the labor reallocation  during the transition may take place smoothly  - that is,
as voluntary  job changing  that does not result in unemployment,  reallocation  in the present crisis is
bound  to call for extensive  lay-offs and lead to massive  unemployment. That has not yet happened.
12Although  enterprises  reduced employment  in 1992, it appears  to havo occurred primarily  through the
less painful shedding  of pensioners, while being quite reluctant to lay off other workers.'
Faced with a difficult economic  situation, Armenian  enterprises adjusted  their demand for
labor in two ways.  First, they have cut back their workforces. Compared  to the last quarter of 1991,
at the end of the first quarter of 1992 the state sector (outside agriculture)  reduced the number  of
employees  by 106,000 (or 9.4 percent).'  Tbe majority of the jobs (60,000) were cut in the so-called
non-material  sphere (education  and culture, and public health), and 46,000 jobs were cut in the so-
called  material sphere (among  the latter, manufacturing  and construction  both shed 15,000 workers,
and trade and catering 11,000 workers).  Second, as in many other FSU economies, enterprises  have
allowed  workers  to retain their jobs, but forced them to take leave while receiving pay amounting  to
only two thirds of their base pay - 336,000 workers were on such forced leave during November
1991  and March 1992.9 (In parallel with these employment  adjustments, there has been a widening
of wage differentials. In one of the enterprises visited by the World Bank mission in April 1992, for
example, the coefficient  of variation of wages for a selected  group of 39 workers increased  from 0.4
in April 1991  to .5 in April 1992.)
In the two months after unemployment  benefits were introduced in March 1992, employment
offices  registered 11,775  job seekers.  About 2000 of them were laid off, 1500 were first-time  job
seekers, over 5000 were labor market reentrants, and over 3,000 had quit their jobs.  By the end of
April 1992, 6105 of job seekers qualified  for unemployment  compensation,  and 65 of them were also
enrolled in training. (Updating  labor market trends with recent developments  is not fruitful, since
these trends are atypical. Namely, the economic  crisis produced  by the economic  blockade has
severely deepened  since the second half of 1992. Although, unfortunately,  the phenomenon  of the
7  At the end of 1991, 150,000 pensioners (out of 580,000) were working.
There was also a 38 thousand cutback in state agricultural employment,  but that
predominantly  reflected  ownership transformation,  that is, the drop in state employment  was
matched  by  an increase in private employment  in agriculture.
9  Armenian employers  have undoubtedly  utilized a variety of job sharing arrangements
including  full leave for entire months and rotating leave for selected shorter periods.
13"economy  under the siege" may not be that uncommon  in the era of the postsocialist  transition, it is
beyond the scope of this investigation.)
2.  Current Labor Market  Policies and Practices
Under central planning, the labor market was characterized  by numerous rigidities. The chief
ones were: job security; administrative  job assignmnents  and informal pressures  to hire; the obligation
to work; non-existence  of legal private sector; rigid working hours; constrained geographic mobility;
and centrally imposed, egalitarian  wage structure.
These labor market rigidities  produced two types of inefficiencies.  First, labor allocation  was
inefficient because  (1) both hiring and dismissal  were divorced  from economic  criteria, (2) labor
turnover was not necessarily enhancing  efficiency, due to a wedge between the wage and the marginal
value product created by employment  subsidies, and (3) internal labor markets were ineffective,
because  of ideological  criteria in hiring and career advancement.  Second,  job security negatively
affected  work incentives  - directly, through the absence  of the stick in the form of the threat of
dismissal, and indirectly, through the weakening  of profit-sharing  as a device for boosting motivation
(Vodopivec  1991b).
Current legislation  addresses  many of the above rigidities. In particular, the new Employment
Law (accepted  in February 1992)  calls for flexible redundancy  regulation, introduces  unemployment
benefits, and removes any constraints  on enterprises' wage bills. In another significant  development,
non-state  employment  has been acknowledged  and encouraged  by other laws.
Emplovment  legislation. Similar to other FSU economies, the new Employment  Law brought
several radical changes. Above all, it frees enterprises  from direct employment  controls by the state.
It explicitly allows the citizenry  to chvose between labor force participation  and non-participation  (in
the Soviet era, the so-called anti-parasite  laws called for administrative  sentencing  of labor force non-
participants to compulsory  work), and between  different types of enterprises (previously,  legislation
was heavily biased against employment  in the private sector). Possibilities  for fixed-term  employment
are also broadened.
14But the Law still smacks of the old interventionism  in some areas. For example, it still
constrains  geographic  mobility through the "propiska" system.  It defines  the "appropriate  job"
(podhodyashchaya  rabota), among  others, by the distance from the permanent  residence (propiska) of
the worker; in Armenia, a distance not to exceed 60-70 km.  Since a worker may only be employed
in an "appropriate  job," this precludes many rural residents from taking  jobs in, and moving to, the
cities (above  all, Yerevan). Moreover, the law stipulates  that th* government  guarantees  work for
some groups of workers (single  mothers, one of the spouses if both are unemployed,  handicappedi,
and released prisoners and persons cured of alcoholism  and drug abuse). ITis guarantee  is achieved
by assigning such workers to both state and other enterprises (the number of assigned workers cannot
exceed five percent of the work force per year).  If enterprises do not want to accept these workers,
they must pay a fine equivalent  to the yearly pay of the refused workers.
Redundancy  legislation.  Tne Employment  Law stipulates that the employer has to give two
months  of advance  notice to workers  to be dismissed (as in many other economies  of FSU), and make
a severance  payment of one month's wage to the worker and the same amount  to the Employment
Fund.  In a mass lay-off (definad  as the one exceeding  five percent of the workforce), the employer
also has to give two-month  notification  to the Employment  Office, and explain  the reasons for the lay-
off. Furthermore, the local Employment  office may delay a lay-off for one month, if it finds
difficulties  in placing the workers to be laid off (the employer may be partly compensated  by the
Employment  Fund for such delays).
Unemployment  benefits. These benefits, together with the notion  of unemployment,  were
previously  non-existent  in Armenia (the Soviet Employment  Law from 1988  which also allowed for
unemployment  benefits was not implemented). The definition of unemployment  is a person who does
not have a job, is searching for a job, and has not turned down more than one appropriate  job offered
by the Employment  office. An appropriate  job is one with an educational  requirement  (qualification)
that matches  the person's educational  attainment. Besides unemployment  compensatioa,
unemployment-related  benefits  include training (period of which is counted  toward pension), training
allowance  (paid at the same rate as unemployment  benefits), and - irrespective  of receiving
1SLa  I a
unemployment  compensation  - means-tested  unemployment  assistance. Unemployment  insurance
benefits  are financed by one percent tax on employer payrolls.
Unemployment  compensation  cash benefits  can not be less than the minimum  wage; for the
laid off workers, it amounts to 75 percent of their past (unindexed)  earnings, for the first eight weeks,
and to 50 percent for additional  24 weeks (each five years of seniority above fifteen brings additional
two weeks of the entitlement). For those unemployed  for reasons other than layoff, unemployment
compensation  is 50 percent of their past wage, paid for 12 weeks (provided  that they have been
amployed  for at least 12 weeks in the last year).  Finally, first-time  job seekers are entitled to the
compensation  equal to the minimum  wage, for 12 weeks. The past wage is measured as the monthly
wage at the time of the layoff.  (The duration of eligibility  to UL  .-iloyment compensation  in other
FSU economies  is similar; some of them, however, have introduced flat-rate benefits - Latvia and
Estonia, for example).
Wage deterrnination. In contrast to wage setting during the Soviet period, enterprises  now
have wide latitude in setting wages.  The former basis for wage setting, the skill-exertion  matrix, is to
be abolished. The government is preparing a new basic wage structure - having  a total range of
wages of 1:15 across fifteen major skill categories  - to be applied to government  workers, and also to
be recommended  for state and other enterprises. This range is to serve as a basic starting point for
enterprise-level  wage determination. In practice wage payments will be supplemented  and modified
by factors such as skill shortages and profitability  at both the industry and enterprise levels.
Current regulations have removed  tax-based incomes  policy introduced  in 1987 (setting  a
ceiling  on the annual increase of the wage bill of enterprises), and thus even state enterprises can
freely set their wage bills.  While desirable from the standpoint of setting interfirm and
interoccupational  pay differentials, the freeing of wages has unfortunate macro-inflationary
implications  that are discussed below.
institutional  Support and Labor Market Programs
EmnlgyMent  offices.  Currently, there are 41 employment  offices  in Armenia: four in the
largest four cities, and one in each of the 37 'rayons" (local  jurisdictions), with total staff of 451.  So
16far, employment  services have only been providing  placement and information  on job vacancies.
With the increase of the scope of their services (to include counseling, administration  of
unemployment  services, and training), as well as in the number of their clients, effectiveness  will be
constrained  by a lack of staff and resources.  Moreover, may  of the current practices of the
employment  services  regarding information  exchangt, placement  and job counseling will have to be
overhauled  to provide  services appropriate  for a market economy.
Training.  The transition to a market economy  will produce many displaced workers while
generating  demand  for skills currently in short supply, both of which will create large demand for
training, retraining, and skills upgrading. The current capacity  of training institutions  to accept
unemployed  workers is substantial. As elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, there are two types of
schools that would  be suitable for training of the unemployed.  First, there are professional  schools
(the so called PTUs); presently 80 in number, which can train about 15,000 persons per year.  The
second type of schools are training centers which are currently used for training employed workers
(they are run directly  with various ministries, or with large enterprises). These centers could train up
to 15,000  trainees per year for blue collar jobs (in 23 training centers), and up to 10,000 per year for
white collar workers (in 16 training centers). 10 But to provide effective retraining for the
unemployed,  current training capacities have to be re-oriented  toward the emerging skills needed in a
market economy,  and training techniques adjusted  to suit experienced  workers.
Public  works.  Current labor legislation  does not foresee public works and/or public service
employment  programs as major elements  of active labor market policy.  Such programs, however, are
presently  carried out under a special presidential  decree, but are kept at a rather modest level, i.e.,
3,000 participants  in 1991.  (In some other FSU economies  - for example, in Ukraine - public
works have been introduced  by law.)
3.  Issues and OQtiuns
The primary goal of labor market policies during the transition must be to facilitate  the
needed  adjustment  both by encouraging  the efficient  reallocation  of labor and spreading  the costs
10  Respectively  these can described as providing qualification  training and retraining.
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equitably  among  the different segments  of population. In doing that, the transitional  economies  are
facing  many difficult  dilemmnas.
The pace of labor reallocation.  This is fundamental, but complex  question. Should firms'
plummeting  production (obviously,  a must during the initial phase of the transition) be accompanied,
and to what extent, by plummeting  employment? That is - should one advise a rapid increase in
unemployment,  and hence high unemployment  rates in short- (and possibly mid-) term?
Tho main task for policy makers - and perhaps the most challenging  one - is to preserve
jobs that are economically  meaningful  and simultaneously  to stimulate  labor shedding in those
industries  and in those enterprises  that suffer from hidden unemployment,  or are economically  non-
viable." 1 Obviously,  there are costs and benefits associated with both extreme scenarios, with no
clear-cut  theoretical  answer.  "  On the one hand, perpetuation  of the status quo does not expose
workers to thei  costs of unemployment  (for example, dissipation  of human  capital, psychic costs,
deterioration  of health) - but it forgoes (slows down) the reallocation  of workers to more productive
uses.  On the other hand, fast shedding of workers contributes to the fast redeployment  of labor in
more productive uses, but it can only occur with significant  adjustment  costs (the ones mentioned
above, plus costs of services provided  to unemployed, plus output forgone  due to increased taxation
to support the unemployed)  - at least initially, these cGsts  probably increase more-than-proportionally
with the speed of transition.
For Armenia  this task is particularly difficult, due to a conflicting  solutions to two of the
pressing  problems  of the Armenian labor mz.ket (Macedonia  is another example). On the
one hand, there is a structural problem of hidden unemployment,  the solution to which
requires labor shedding; on the other hand, there is a temporary problem of insufficient
supply of energy and inputs due to the economic  blockade, the solution to which requires
preserving  employment.  As long as the blockade persists, jobsharing arrangements  can be
helpful in preserving  jobs without  the necessity of maintaining  full time work schedules  for
all workers. Job sharing can be accomplished  through working  part week sc"edules and/or
through rotating layoffs, both of which preserve job attachments  for workers.
12  Few theoretical  insights  have been generated so far.  One of the most interesting  is Gavin
(1993), whose dynamic control model shows that the "shock-therapy"  approach to economic
reform may generate an excessive  adjustment  and thus excessively  high rate of unemployment
during the transition (his results, however, hinge heavily on the assumption  that the gross
flow out of unemployment  is less-than-proportionally  increasing  in the number  of
unemployed).
18Although layoffs are unappelling and painful, costs associated  with the perpetuation  of the
status quo are often much higher.  A radical break with the tradition  of virtually  unlimited  job
security is called for.  The government  must, therefore, encourage firms to shed surplus labor by
redundancy  legislation  that would not impose  undue costs on firms, as well as shut down and liquidate
frms with the poorest prospects and performance. To avoid jeopardizing  the sustainability  of
reforms, however, the government  should try to build support for the reforms.  Possible options are
(1) establishing  a National Conciliation  Council (with a tripartite structure - the government, trade
unions and employers)  to discuss  future polices and legislation, (2) launching  of a public relations -
public information  campaign  to demonstrate  unavoidability  of the reforms (as a price to be paid for
the long-lasting  wrong policies of the past), as well as to counterbalance  the perceivMd  negative
developments  (increased un4mnlnyment)  by emphasizing  successes (such as peopve  obtaining regular
employment  after finishing training or public employment  programs), and (3) introdrcing strong
active labor market policies (see below).
During the initial period of the transition, there seems to be scope for some temnorary,
palliative  measures: reduction of working time, work-sharing, subcontracting  of workers to other
enterprises, with the wage bill rather than the size of employment  taking the brunt of adjustment.
Although  such a workforce adjustment  has been found to hinder closing  of the least efficient  plants in
Western Europe (Houseman 1988), it may prove a desirable way of workforce adjustment  in the
initial period of the transition.  Above all, adjustment  costs are spread equitably  across the workforce.
But such an adjustment  may also be defended  from the efficiency standpoint  - it may soften the shock
of transition by preparing workers  psychologically  for possible future layoffs, and induce some
workers to quit.  Moreover, at the beginning  of transition, the absorptive  capacity  of the private
sector, as well as effectiveness  of training institutions  is likely to be limited, increasing the chances  of
long spells of unemployment.
Some protective measures  of the Armenian government,  however, seem to be
counterproductive. For example,  the government  may want to reconsider current  job guarantees for
certain categories  of workers (see employment  legislation  above).  The program is laudable  from a
humanitarian  point of view and similar to programs present in many advanced  market economies.
19But it is less defensible given Armenia's present circumstances  of deficient labor demand and the need
to transform  the enviromment  of the workplace  to achieve higher productivity. As the experience  of
successful,  socially-conscious  countries (for example, Western European ones) shows, government
must help cerain groups of the population  (for example, the poor and disabled). Such a help,
however, need no. consist of job assignments  when there are alternatives such as income support
payments  (social  assistance) and investment  in training and re-habilitation  (particular attention  should
be paid to invalids, dive  to their abnormally  large numbers in the labor force as the consequence  of
the 1988  earthquake).
Another  protective measure with likely negative  consequences  is the grant of authority to
Employment  offices  to delay mass layoffs when they  judge it difficult to place redundant  workers (see
above  on redundancy  legislation). Such government  interference in layoffs could inhibit the transition
to the market economy. The advance notice requirement  and the authorization  to delay mass layoffs
for one month per se do not represent major threats, but could provide a statutory basis for
administrative  interference  in the transition. Repeated  use of such authority could prevent needed
adjustments  if enterprise perceive that they will not be supported in their efforts to restructure  the
workplace.  Furthermore, if interventions  in layoffs are anticipated  it could lead to rent-seeking
behavior  on the part of enterprises, as well as require complex analyses  to determine what losses, if
any, were imposed  by the delay of the layoffs.
Earlv retirement .s also an option, but it must be used cautiously  not to jeopardize the
sustainability  of pension programs.  Mitchell  (1992) advocates actuarially reduced benefits  for early
retirement. She also argues that 'retirement systems are not well-suited  to solve unemployment
problems,' and thus advises against government  sponsored early retirement programs.  In particular,
she finds that generous early retirement  programs not only raise fiscal burden of current and future
workers, ihereby  reducing labor demand, but also fail to improve demand for young workers
13  The danger is that the ratio of retirees to employees increases dramatically;  for example, in
Slovenia  (where the government  offered generous subsidies to encourage early retirement),
the ratio increased from 1:2.6 to 1:2 in just two years (December 1989  - December 1991);
see Vodopivec  and Hribar-Milic (1992).
20(especially  if low substitution  between old and young workers, as seems to be the case)."
Moreover, decreased  labor force participation due to early retirement decreases the level of
unemployment  and hence its importance in disciplining  workers.
Wage Seqn.
The old system of wage setting has been demolished, and it seems that a new, well-
functioning  system is stIll only a remote goal (in Armenia, as well as in other FSU countries). The
situation  is exacerbated  by the conflict between the macro and micro aspects of wage policy,
particularly obvious  during the transition.  There is a clear need to inhibit the ag.1regate  increase in
money  wage bIll to be consistent  with macroeconomic  needs, i.e., to prevent the labor market from
being a source of inflationary  impulses. At the same time, the structure of relative wages  should be
free to adjust  to provide  ongoing signals of supply-demand  imbalances  in the labor market.  Balancing
these considerations  will represent a continuing  challenge as the transition  proceeds.
What kind of incomes  poliv?  In deciding about  the total wage bill of enterprises, the
pendulum  has swung too far in the other direction - toward a complete  freedom, even for state
enterprises. Based on the experience in Eastern Europe, however, a consensus  has emerged among
economists  that while state ownership prevails, an incomes  policy is necessary.  "1 In the existing
highly monopolistic  markets, and until financial discipline  is strengthened (budget  constraint
tightened),  state enterprises  may - in the absence  of any constraints  on wage payments  - increase
their wages well above increases in productivity,  thereby contributing  to inflationary  pressures.
As for the choice of an incomes policy, many opt for a tax-based one."'  But should such
1  Laczko and Phillipson (1991) also report that employers  felt restricted by being forced  to
substitute  retirees with unemplcyed  school leavers in the government  sponsored "Job Release
Programs" in the UK and France.  Due to redefining  workers as early retirees, such
programs only cosmetically  reduced unemployment;  and it remains unclear whether these
programs spurred substitution  of old by young workers.
I  See, for example, Coricelli and Revenga (1992).
16  There is one disturbing  argument against tax-based  incomes  policy, though. The prevalence  of
state ownership  not only creates a danger of the wage drift, but also jeopardizes the
effectiveness  of the tax-based incomes  policy:  if a firm can "borrow"  to pay excess wages, it
may  Also  be in a position o borrow even more to pay excess wages and taxes imposed  on
such wage increases. If sufficient hardening  of budget constraints  can not be implemented,
21policies (through the choice of the tax base) take account of enterprise productivity? Some argue that
enterprise productivity  increases  should not be connected  to the wage growth (the externality
argument of Layard (1990);"  inflationary  pressures, particularly under the mcnopolistic  market
structure that prevails in transition economies). But remembering  the positive effects of profit-sharing
in market economies, both on the macro level (less layoffs - see, e.g, Weitzman 1984) and micro
level (improved  productivity  - Ellnder 1990), it is also possible that linking wages to enterprise
productivity  would contribute  to wage- instead of employment  adjustnent, as well as stimulate
productivity. It thus seems that wage-productivity  link is desirable on microeconomic  ground
(improved  productivity),  but less so on macroeconomic  ground (increased inflationary  pressure).  (A
related problem associated with the averags wage as the tax base is the bias against highly skilled
industries  and firms introduced  throuagh  such a ax.)
What kind of collective  bar_njjng?  Alti.  )ugh collective  bargaining  in FSU is still in a
rudirmentary  stage of development,  un.ons are expected  to participate  actively in wage determination
in the longer run."'  However, there is no tradition of labor-management  negotiations  in Armenia.
As noted, the largest union confederation  is a direct carryover (including  leadership) from the former
Soviet period. Initially, the management  side of collective  bargaining alsc will be inexperienced.  A
structural framework  (both the formal and informal structure) for wage bargaining also will need to
be established.
agreeing  to general wage increases  through encompassing  bargaining would be a more
desirable solution - but, unfortunately,  often not a pract-cal  one.
17  But Layard notes that productivity  growth he has in mind is associated  mainly with
technological  progress (that is, it is given exogenously);  in tran,itional economies, on
contrary, productivity  growth can be produced by increasing  effort, and decreasing
organizational  slack in general (that is, productivity  growth depends on the reward system).
"  Presently, there are two trade unions in Armenia: besides the old, "official"  trade unions -
whose leadership is still virtually  unchanged  from the Soviet times - there is also a new trade
union 'Miabanutun" (in translation "Spiritual  Unity"); the two formed a loose confederation.
Miabanutun  is much smaller; it has 35,000 members, mostly fiom technical intelligentsia,
while the rest of the workers are members  of the old trade unions. (As under the Soviet
Union, virtually all workers are members  of one of the trade unions.)
22In the long run, small, open, highly unionized economies should try to steer the collective
bargaining in 'le direction  of encompassing  bargaining, thus rendering incomes  polices unnecessary.
Such a system (practiced, for example, in Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Germany),  characterized  by
wide-spread  coverage and highly centralized  bargaining, enables that the benefits  from wage
moderation  can be shared mutually  by all participants  of the collective  bargaining  process (Layard
1990).
Guidance  for setting intra-fimrn  wage differentials? As mentioned  above, government  wants to
apply the basic wage scale developed  for the civil service also outside government. But applying  such
a scale - even only as a recommendation  - to state enterprises, let alone private ones, would be
counterproductive. The scale will raise expectations  both on the part of workers and employers, and
thus distort relative wages and inhibit dynamic adjustments  in the wage structure.  Possible effects
include  reduced mobility  of labor, inhibition  of employment,  and the reduction of overall productivity
(the latter caused  by the lowered morale of the more productive workers, if the regulations tilt the
distribution  toward egalitarianism). To assure minimum  income for workers, however, the
government  should set and maintain  the minimum  wage slightly above the poverty line, and adjust
minimum  wage in the future by discretionary  action.
What kind of fringe benefits? The present system offers many types of fringe benefits.
Workers are entitled to pension, disability,  paid vacation, and paid materniity  and sick leave.  These
are normal social insurance benefits ir a market economy. In Armenia, as elsewhere in the former
Soviet  Union, these benefits are widely available and payment levels are quite generous. Ready
availability  of these benefits  generates disincentives  to work.
Additionally  other types of fringe benefits are also provided which are typically not found in
a market economy. These are financed from the so-called social development  funds of the enterprises
and are provided "in  kind."  They include provision of housing, payment of mortgage and consumer
credits, obtaining  lots for building a "dacha," paid excursions and traveling, and free meals.
These benefits  introduce inefficiency  into wage setting.  First, enterprises  may prefer in-kind
benefits  because  they are taxed less than the wage fund. Once the tax status is equalized,  workers are
likely to prefer cash payments. Second, many of the in-kind benefits are provided  to workers in the
23same quantities.  Due to different tastes, many workers would prefer cash payments and the freedom
to decide for themselves  what to buy.
Reform  of fringe benefit availability  should receive attention. Among the gains to be realized
are reduced  labor costs for enterprises, improved  labor supply inc lntives for workers and budgetary
savings. Directions  for change to be considered  could include the following; cashing  out in-lund
benefits  finar^ed from the social development  funds, reduced availability  of disability and retirement
pensions, shorter periods of paid maternity leave, and more active monitoring  of sick leave usage.
In , macroeconomic  environment  of substantial  inflation, the relative attractiveness  of work
could be improved  by adjusting fringe benefit payment levels less than the rate of money  wage
inflation. Of course, care should be taken to maintain  living standards of the poorest recipients  of
cash and in-kind  benefits.
Geoiranhic mobility. Not only is the present system of internal  passports extremely  unjust, it
is also inefficient  - it precludes selection from the larger pool of candidates  and thus hinders
competition. Another, longer-term  task of the government  is therefore fostering  geographic mobility
of labor by removing  the "propiska" considerations  from the criteria for job eligibility  and provision
of medical  services. To prevent undue strain upon the cities, a gradual approach seems called for.
Government  may want to consider  such a move in conjunction  with privatization  of housing, which
will improve the efficiency of the housing market.  Moreover, to enhance mobility  of labor, the
provision  of some fringe benefits (for example,  housing) should not be linked to employment.
Unemployment  benefit.  Both the replacement  ratio and duration of benefits seem to fit
Armenia  from a budgetary standpoint  (with the caveat that the first two month replacement  ratio for
those on layoff could also be 50 percent).  But current unemployment  compensation  is inconsistent  in
two ways, both of which jeopardize the affordability  of the system.  First, because the current law
differentiates  among  workers on the basis of their reason fo: unemployment  (laid off workers are
treated  more favorably than others) the potential  for "gaming"  and disincentives  must be recognized.
Care must be taken to ensure that workers claiming  to be on layoff have not quit their previous  jobs.
Also, the longer  potential duration for those on layoff should be monitored for evidence  of active  job
search.  Second, the system unduly extends  unemployment  compensation  to first time job-seekers,
24and unemployment  assistance  to family members of the unemployed. Because typically the eligibility
basis for unemployment  compensation  is past employment,  those with no employment  record should
not be entitled to unemployment  compensation.
The current system with employment  offices in all areas could function as a social assistance
program. In the short term - until a comprehensive  social assistance  program is introduced  - this
may be appropriate. In the longer term, however, only workers with substantial work histories
should be eligible  for unemployment  compensation. Applying  this principle to Armenia means that
(a) first-time  job seekers and labor market re-entrants should not be offered unemployment
compensation,  nor should the basis of eligibility  be employment  training; and (b) job quitters, on the
other hand, should be eligible for unemployment  compensation  (but only after they undergo a
prolonged  disqualification  spell to discourage  quitting in order to collect benefits).
In the long run, unemployment  compensation  should be earnings  related, i.e., higher past
earnings  yielding higher monthly benefits. To facilitate  the administration  of an earnings-related
benefit, development  of automated  reporting of worker earnings is needed. This will greatly increase
the capacity  of the Employment  offices to serve large numbers of unemployed  and make accurate
determinations  of benefit levels. In the present environment  of low utilization  of productive capacity
and high inflation,  however, paying a benefits  at a single (or flat) rate to eligible workers has
advantages  both from an administrative  perspective  and to effect budgetary savings.
Employment  services. To ensure effective re-employment  programs for the increased  number
of unemployed,  the government  should increase the resources available fur employment  services.
Employment  offices should simplify and streamlin3  the registration  procedures for unemployed
(among  others, by letting applicants  to fill registration  forms, and advising  them about vacancies
before registering  them, so as to avoid unnecessary  registrations);  and computerize and inter-connect
their information  systems (particularly  micro information  on the unemployed, their previous earnings
(for computing  benefits and stipends) and information  on job vacancies). To increase employment
office efficiency  approaches  based on self- or group- service should be developed.  More attention
should be paid to job counseling,  both regarding  demand prospects for possible occupational  choices
as well the assessment  of personal skills and interests.
25The optimal  mix of labor market policies.  Transitional  economies  are faced with a difficult
dilemma  of how much resources to devote to income support versus active  policies (indeed, the
practice in OECD countries  is very diverse), as well as the appropriate mix of active policies during
the transition (training vs. job search assistance  vs. wage subsidies vs. public employment  programs
vs. public works).  What works and what does not work, in economies  so vastly different from
anything  we have been dealing with before, is a very difficult question. The experience  of developed
economies  is of limited value and research on transition economies  themselves  is badly needed."'
Moreover, active  labor market policies have to be weighed against alternative  policies aimed at
reduction of unemployed  - notably increased public expenditures and investment  tax credits (see
Garfinkel and Palmer 1978).
Training. To provide  effective retraining  for the unemployed, current training capacities  have
to be re-oriented  toward the emerging  skills needed in a market economy. This includes adapting  the
a choice of courses  offered as well as adjusting  training techniques  to suit the adults.  Such training
may include modular  training; small-business  programs for different groups of clients (focusing  on
setting-up  small businesses,  as well as on their organization,  marketing, and  financing); training and
retraining  of older workers; and training for re-settling refugees and displaced workers. It must be
remembered,  however, that in a labor market with deficient  aggregate demand, the size of the
displacement  effects associated  with placing trainees is large, emphasizing  the simultaneous  need to
increase  the total number of job openings.
But governments  in transitional economies  face difficult decisions  regarding training.  It is not
only unclear how important  the training component in the active labor market programs shou;d be,
there are may other unanswered  questions related to training.  For example,  should training be
provided  by private or public institutions? Should it be targeted on specific  groups, and, if so, on
which ones?  Moreover, what is the appropriate mix of qualification  training versus retraining versus
skill upgrading? What can we lean  from the experience of developed  countries? Summarizing
'9  Tle research on Slovenia  - currently under way - will be useful in this respect, providing
guidance  and evidence,  among others, on (dis)incentives  of unemployment  insurance;  the
usefulness  of grants to unemployed  to spur self-employment;  and the effects of hiring
subsidies  (see Abraharn  and Vodopivec 1991).
26American experience, for example,  Leigh (1990) finds workers under age 45, and women, as
benefiting  more than others from training, while Hollister and Haveman  (1989) single out those with
the least previous labor market experience, women, and disadvantaged  as the group for which training
was the most effective.  As for the type of training, Hollister and Haveman  find on-the-job  training,
and Leigh job search assistance  especially  effective.
Waffe  subsidie.  While the limitation  on the private sector seems natural, there are numerous
other considerations  that have to be taken into account regarding wage subsidies  in the FSU countries.
Chief among them are the following:
- Targeting. As Mangum  et al (1992) claim, targeting helps raising employment  of targeted
groups, but it may have fewer positive  net effects, because employers  may substitute  targeted
for non-targeted  labor, and stigmatize  the targeted group.  Instead  of targeting, Hamermesh
(1978)  thus advocates a general wage subsidy (he also proposes  a fixed amount subsidy, to
favor low-skilled  labor, for each worker day increase in net employment).
- Hiring vs. employment  subsidies. Should subsidies apply to the stock of employment
(subsidization  of a worker during the entire time of employment)  or flow into employment
(subsidization  of a worker during initial period of employment)?
- Marginality. Should subsidies  apply to all new hires, all only to increased  hires beyond the
base level of employment)?
- Nationwide  vs. regional subsidies. Regional subsidies may reduce migration  from the
affected  regions, which tends to decrease their efficiency in alleviating  regional
unemployment.
To achieve  the diverse goals transitional  economies  are likely to pursue during the transition, a
combination  of the above types of subsidies  may be appropriate, perhaps a mix of targeted hiring
subsidies  (for youth, disadvantaged)  and general marginal subsidies (possibly  more generous in
depressed areas, to stem migration).
Public works and public service employment. Armenia is likely to experience  deficient labor
demand for at least the next few years. During this period several temporary  employment  projects
could be identified  that would both provide useful services while employing  persons who would
27otherwise  be unemployed. The temporary projects could be explicitly countercyclical  and/or targeted
on specific geographic  areas (such as the earthquake  zone). Two generic types of public employment
projects can be identified; public works and public service employment. The distinction  between  the
two is somewhat  arbitrary but public works generally entail the use of substantial capital and material
inputs as well as labor to produce identifiable  products such as roads and buildings. Public service
employment  is usually viewed as producing  services from processes where labor is the practically  the
only input.
In a labor market characterized  by excess labor supply which can be anticipated  at least
through 1994, expanding  the scope of public employment  programs could yield positive benefits. At
present  there is a clear need for public infrastructure  (highways), new residential construction
(particularly  in the earthquake  zone), and building repair (both residential and commercial).
Numerous  persons  previously  employed in construction  facing the short run prospect (or actuality)  of
unemployment  could provide  the workforce for such public works.
Also, to assist workers particular difficulties  in finding  jobs, government may want to directly
create jobs through public service employment  programs (in areas such as assistance  to the elderly,
child care, and environmental  clean-up). To maximize  the positive effects on employment,  such
programs should use labor intensive  techiiiques  and pay wages only slightly above the minimum
wage.
Several considerations  should be kept in mind to assure effectiveness  of temporary  job
creation  projects. There is a need to first identify  the highest priority projects and then to marshall the
associated  capital and entrepreneurial  resources to make these projects most successful. Reliance  on
labor intensive  approaches  is appropriate.  Also, wage payments to participants  should be restricted to
modest levels.
In an environment  of deficient employment  demand, other elements of active labor market
policy such as training and job placement  services face the problem of high displacement  rates, i.e., a
high proportion  of those placed take jobs that otherwise  would have been secured by others. To make
these other labor market programs more successful, it is important  to increase the total number  of
new job openings (even if the jobs are temporary). Although total budget expenditures  are increased,
28the net increase in the budget deficit must recognize savings in unemployment  insurance payments  and
other cash benefits  and increases in total tax receipts associated  with temporary  jobs.
Some of the standard criticisms  of temporary employment  programs may not apply to the
current situation in Armenia. Timing of start-up and phase-down  is not a problem because full
employment  is not likely to be reestablished  in the near term. Identifying  priority geographic areas is
eased  by the existence  of two large urban areas in the zone of the 1988  earthquake. Housing
construction  in this zone would have very high social benefits. Constructing  highway and rail links to
the outside thus reducing the isolation of the country from foreign energy sourczs would also have
very high returns.
Questions,  of course, can be raised as to the desirability  of these types of programs versus,
say, wage subsidies. Care should be taken to ensure that projects are temporary so that they self
liquidate  as the economy  returns to full employment. Participation  should be secured through financial
incentives  not mandatory  requirements, e.g., pay should exceed the level of the unemployment
compensation  cash benefit but not fully match wages in the competitive  labor market.  Also care
should be taken to avoid displacement  effects, i.e., the projects should not merely replace existing
public projects. Finally, selecting  priorities for such projects would need to be carefully  done to
conserve  on limited  budgetary resources. The simultaneous  existence  of public needs and unemployed
labor resources provide the conditions  for successful efforts in this area.
Grants for self-emplovment. One program that may be promising is lump-sum  payment of
unemployment  benefits conditional  on starting-up a business. To date a limited number of
evaluations  of such programs have been undertaken. The Report of the Secretary of Labor's Task
Force on Economic  Adjustment  and Worker Dislocation (U.S. Department  of Labor 1986) places
great hopes in such a program. Preliminary evidence  from evaluations  conducted in the states  of
Pennsylvania  and Washington  provide a mixed picture. The net employment  multiplier effects may be
small and the failure rates for new businesses  may be high.  Given the obvious scope for the growth
of the private sector, such a program may be more successful in transitional  economies.
Job search  assistance. Some found job search assistance,  providing inexpensive,  quick
intervention  at the site, among  the most efficient  progranms  (Seitchik  and Zornitsky 1989, and Leigh
291990). Compared  to formal training has a much larger bang for the buck in recent U.S. evaluations.
For example, Leigh (1990) reports that job search assistance  strongly affects re-employment
earnings, placement  and employment  rates, and level of unemployment  insurance benefits.
Mass-layoff  assistance.  Research in the U.S. has found that worker displacement  associated
with mass layofts is often followed  by prolonged and difficult  periods of adjustment.  Lengthy
unemployment  durations, substantial  decreases in labor force participation  and large real earnings
reductions  at reemployment  are among the major consequences  for affected  workers.'  There is no
reason to expect easier adjustments  in FSU economies.
Research  on worker displacement  in the U.S. and Canada has found that activist policy
responses  can lessen these effects. Early intervention  by employment  offices (including initial contacts
before displacement  actually takes place) and providing a variety of adjustment  services such as
counselling,  job search assistance,  assistance  in the preparation  of resumes, skills assessments  all can
facilitate  successful transitions  to other jobs. Encouragement  of active  job search early in the period
of unemployment  also has been shown to speed reemployment.
Active and timely interventions  require substantial  commitments  of resources, far beyond the
capacities  of FSU economies'  current employment  offices. However, the payoffs in unemployment
reductions  may make the commitment  of resources cost effective.
4.  Concluding  Remarks
A key feature of the transition of the FSU economies  will be a massive  displacement of
workers, together with labor shortages for certain skills.  One of the major challenges  of the transition
will therefore be to reallocate  labor at the lowest social costs - that is, designing  policies and
programs that will fit both workers' interests and needs and changing  employment  oppoiiunities. To
that end, a radical overhaul of the labor market institutions  from the Soviet era is called for.
While the general orientation  of the labor market reforms in the FSU economies - leaving
primary responsibility  for finding  a job to the individual,  and letting state provide a social safety net
a  Tabular sumnmaries  from each of the five dislocated  worker surveys conducted in the U.S.
between  January 1984  and January 1992  have consistently  shown  these patterns.
30and a conducive  environment  for generation  of jobs - is undoubtedly  correct, these economies  face a
host of problems  in their efforts to bring such an orientation into life.  Thesa problems range from
choosing  the right pace of labor reallocation,  to setting up a well-functioning  wage determination
system, to fostering  geographic mobility, to providing adequate income support to jobless and the
poor, and to designing  appropriate  active labor market policies.  Although  the experience  of Western
economies  shows that government  can play a key role in speeding reemployment  while cushioning
displaced  workers from loss of earnings, the complexities  of the process of transition preclude faithful
copying  of programs and policies of other countries.  (Armenia's problems are even more acute
because  of the military conflict  with Azerbaijan  and associated economic  blockade.)
In these circumstances  labor market policy prescriptions - regarding a wide range of issues -
cannot be offered with confidence. To us it seems prudent to avoid mistakes such as rigid adherence
to a single set of policy prescriptions. To determine which polices are most effective, a trial and
error approach is suggested. Further, appropriate  policies will undoubtedly  change if underlying
niacro circumstances  change, e.g., the rate of inflation  declines.
Some general policy guidelines  do seem appropriate. First, undertake several initiatives as
opposed  to exclusive  reliance on a single policy intervention. Worker training may be the most
productive  intervention, but this conclusion  should be derived from actual experience  where other
interventions  such as job search assistance, self employment  grants and temporary  public employment
are also undertaken. Second, resources should be devoted to monitoring and evaluating  the various
interventions. This is a key aspect of an empirical (as opposed to ideological)  approach  for
ascertaining  "what works."  Third, coordinate  the active policy interventions  as well as the interface
between active  ar.i paasive.  instruments. Fourth, be influenced  by the present macro environment  and
be prepared to change as the environment  changes. One opportunity afforded  by high inflation, for
example,  is to widen the wedge between wages and the various cash and in-kind  transfers.
Restraining  growth in the level of transfer payments  will improve work incentives  at the same time it
saves on budget  expenditures  and employer  labor costs.
The virtue of flexibility  cannot be overemphasized.  Some policy interventions  will be
unsuccessful. Others may work better than expected and be worthy of wider application.
31Terminating  policy initiative  as well Initiating  them must be done. Flexibility  is also required in the
face of changes  in economic circumstances.  When inflation  abates, for example, it will then be more
appropriate  to consider paying cash benefits  on the basis of prior earnings. Another way to
characterize  this approach is to be sensitive to signals and to changes in signals. This frame of mind
will  help to avoid  big errors that economies in transition can ill afford.
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